


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA  
Richmond Division



RANDALL R. INMAN, SR., )  
                                )  
Plaintiff,                 )  
                                )  
v.                            ) Civil Action No. 3:09CV589-HEH  
                                )  
RICK GUNTER,              )  
                                )  
Defendant.                )

**MEMORANDUM OPINION**  
**(Dismissing Without Prejudice Action Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983)**

Plaintiff, a Virginia prisoner proceeding *pro se*, brings this § 1983 civil rights action. The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the action was referred to the Magistrate Judge for initial review. Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(3).

**I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

The Magistrate Judge made the following findings and recommendations:

**Preliminary Review**

This Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) “is frivolous” or (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The first standard includes claims based upon “an indisputably meritless legal theory,” or claims where the “factual contentions are clearly baseless.” *Clay v. Yates*, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (*quoting Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” *Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin*, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (*citing* 5A Charles A. Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. *Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari*, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); *see also Martin*, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “require[] only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (*quoting Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs can not satisfy this standard with complaints containing only “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” *Id.* at 555 (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” *id.* (citation omitted), stating a claim that is “plausible on its face,” *id.* at 570, rather than merely “conceivable.” *Id.* “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (*citing Bell Atl. Corp.*, 550 U.S. at 556). Therefore, in order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must “allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim.” *Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.*, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (*citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.*, 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); *Iodice v. United States*, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)).

Lastly, while the Court liberally construes *pro se* complaints, *Gordon v. Leake*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate’s advocate, *sua sponte* developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. *See Brock v. Carroll*, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

### Summary of Allegations

Rick Gunter, the editor of the Crewe-Burkeville Journal (“the Journal”), promised Plaintiff that he would write a story about Plaintiff’s unjust incarceration and his medical situation. Gunter, however, did not follow through on this promise. Thereafter, Plaintiff wrote Gunter a letter inquiring how much the Journal would charge to print Plaintiff’s story. Gunter did not

respond to Plaintiff's letter. Plaintiff contends that Gunter violated Plaintiff's right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment.<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff demands \$100,000 and injunctive relief.

### **Analysis**

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. *See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley*, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998) (*citing* 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” *Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc.*, 562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are no allegations in the complaint that plausibly suggest Gunter, a newspaper editor, was acting under color of state law. *See Thompson v. Flint Journal Newspaper*, No. 83-1508, 1985 WL 13133, at \*1 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 1985). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the action be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim and as legally frivolous.

(Report and Recommendation entered on June 25, 2010.) The Court advised Plaintiff that he could file objections or an amended complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of entry thereof. On August 20, 2010, Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the action.

### **II. STANDARD OF REVIEW**

“The magistrate makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court.” *Estrada v. Witkowski*, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D.S.C. 1993) (*citing* *Mathews v. Weber*, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976)). This Court “shall make a de novo

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<sup>1</sup> “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. I.

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “The filing of objections to a magistrate’s report enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues – factual and legal – that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985). In the absence of a specific written objection, this Court may adopt a magistrate judge’s recommendation without conducting a *de novo* review. *See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005).

### III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not filed objections or an amended complaint. Instead, Plaintiff has moved to voluntarily dismiss the present action. Plaintiff is entitled to have his action dismissed without prejudice, but he must shoulder the consequences of filing a frivolous action with respect to the three strikes provisions of the 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See Sumner v. Tucker*, 9 F. Supp.2d 641, 644 (E.D. Va. 1998). Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation will be ACCEPTED AND ADOPTED, and the action will be DISMISSED. The Clerk will be DIRECTED to note the disposition of the action for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

An appropriate Order shall issue.

Date: Oct 25, 2010  
Richmond, Virginia

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Henry E. Hudson  
United States District Judge